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Introduction. 
 
As one of Karin Aijmer’s fields of interest is that of semantics, a discus-
sion of a polysemous word may not come amiss in this context. The dif-
ference between homonymy and polysemy is clear enough in principle, if 
often less clear in actual practice.1 As the semantic differences are 
greater, by definition, between homonyms than between different uses of 
a polysemous word, it might be thought that ambiguity, especially prob-
lematic ambiguity, is restricted to the sphere of homonyms. I will try to 
demonstrate with the help of the English verb risk that such is not the 
case. 
The verb risk is just one in a family of formally related words: risk 
n., risk v., risky, riskiness, riskful and perhaps risqué, and also of seman-
tically related ones like danger, hazard, venture and gamble, invest, ex-
pose. In their plea for semantic frames, Fillmore and Atkins (1992) show 
that such relations will all have to be taken into account for an exhaustive 
description of a word to be possible.2 Pustejovsky (2000:77ff.) formal-
ises the main meanings of risk by introducing a privative factor that acts 
as a coercion operator; he thus arrives at an abstract description of the 
meanings of the verb. My own aim here is much more modest. By study-
ing a few examples of the interplay of two main senses of the verb, I 
hope to demonstrate ways in which ambiguity can arise and also to sug-
gest some of the devices hearers/readers use to deal with it. 
                                                      
 
 
 
1 There are many problematic cases such as the relationship between metal1 
‘solid mineral substance’ and metal2 ‘small stones for making roads’ (cf. “a 
metalled road”). 
2 “by displaying the frame and its categories, describing the manner of introduc-
tion of associated concepts within the frame, and adding whatever embellish-
ments a given usage requires.” (Fillmore and Atkins 1992:99) 
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Polysemous ‘risk’. 
 
A person might refer to a very dangerous situation by saying “I might 
risk my life doing this”, or, equally, by saying “I might risk my own 
death doing this”. This anomaly points up the semantic duality of the 
verb to risk, a duality that is likely to pass by unnoticed most of the time 
in conversation and in writing but which is sometimes apt to cause mis-
understanding. 
The identification of a word as polysemous, and the distinction be-
tween its different senses may not always be obvious; Fillmore and At-
kins (2000: 101) hold that “even for lexicographers there are no objective 
criteria for the analysis of a word into senses”. Nor is this only a matter 
of objective facts. Different semantic theories take different views of the 
relationship between extralinguistic factors and their linguistic represen-
tations, theories that can be ranged along a scale from reductionist, with 
few semantic entities, to expansionist, with many. The number of 
polysemous words in the language will therefore vary with the type of 
semantic theory. To many or most observers, however, the verb risk is 
undoubtedly a polysemous word. Its meaning can be understood as made 
up of two main components: 
 
(A) ‘to hazard an act or something pleasant or valuable’ (as in “to risk a guess” or 
“to risk money”); and  
(B) ‘to possibly expose oneself to something unpleasant’ (as in “to risk bank-
ruptcy”).  
 
In both cases, A and B, the action implicit in risk is normally undertaken 
to achieve something worthwhile, a Goal.3 There is a difference between 
A and B in that the risk the subjects are running is not made explicit in A 
but is always explicit in B. If you risk a guess, the risk is that you may be 
wrong, and if you risk your money, the risk is that you will never see it 
again, but in either case the possible (unwanted) consequence is not spe-
                                                      
 
 
 
3 Fillmore and Atkins (1992:81). 
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cified. In B sentences, on the other hand, the risk the subject is running 
(e.g. “bankruptcy”) functions as the object and is always specified. 
Speakers can choose to focus either on what is being hazarded (A) or 
on its unwelcome possible consequences (B). Fillmore and Atkins (1992: 
82) use the terms Valued Object/Victim and Harm, respectively. If 
speakers focus on what is being hazarded, they will say e.g. risk one’s 
life, money, career; or risk a guess, blowing one’s nose, etc., all the time 
leaving ‘with possibly unwanted consequences’ unexpressed. Here the 
object of risk is the word(s) denoting the act or the valuable or pleasant 
things. If, on the other hand, they focus on the possible consequences, 
they might say risk death, jail, humiliation, etc., where the object of risk 
is the word(s) denoting the danger or unpleasantness that may material-
ise. The entity that is being endangered in this perspective (normally a 
person or persons)4 is usually the actor, the subject of the clause. 
 
 
Corpus evidence. 
 
In order to look a little more closely into the function of the verb risk in 
modern English I have made use of material in the CobuildDirect Cor-
pus. 
Risk (A). Examples of what will here be called risk A are usually 
easy to distinguish from the rest. What is being endangered is a valuable 
or pleasant thing, so noun phrases with a positive semantic prosody 
abound: her good looks, her job, her life, his freedom, his reputation, 
your money, my career, our most precious asset, peace and prosperity, 
their capital, etc. Note that the A noun is typically preceded by a posses-
sive; it is something that belongs to you or that you have influence over 
that you may put at risk. The risk is implied but, as we saw, not speci-
fied. What is hazarded can also be an act (a “deed” in Fillmore and At-
kins 1992: 94ff). Some typical A cases are the following: 
                                                      
 
 
 
4 There are exceptions, such as “And as with any compromise it [=the plan] 
risks satisfying no-one.” (Corpus: bbc/06. Text: S1000900915.) Sentence (4), 
below, is not really an exception: “a chopper” stands for “a chopper/helicopter 
crew”. 
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(1)  I also risk a pound a week on the lottery [...] (Corpus: today/11. Text: 
N6000941205.) 
 
(2)  A friend of Kevin said: “It was typical of him to risk his own life to help 
a child in his care.” (Corpus: sunnow/17. Text: N9119980626.) 
 
In such cases it is obvious that something valuable is being put at risk in 
order to achieve some goal. A few examples of acts, “deeds”, with pos-
sibly unwanted consequences are these: 
 
(3)  Not only that, his employees lived in constant fear of him. They would-
n't risk drinking behind his back. (Corpus: ukbooks/08. Text: 
B0000001320.) 
 
(4)  Even a chopper wouldn't risk flying over the area. (Corpus: ukbooks/08. 
Text: B0000001320.) 
 
Again we are not told what might befall the subjects, even if we could 
guess. 
Risk (B). B examples are those where the risk is specified as the ob-
ject of risk and the subject is what/who is being exposed to it. Some ex-
amples are: 
 
(5)  Mobile phone users risk bad health after a mere two minutes of use. 
(Corpus: sunnow/17. Text: N9119980517.) 
 
(6)  Thieves don't want to risk being seen. (Corpus: ukephem/02. Text: 
E0000001244.) 
 
With both the A and the B perspective the object of risk could be an 
act expressed as a gerund (but see below). Again, the difference between 
them is that in the A perspective the act is seen as possibly having unde-
sirable consequences, but in the B perspective it is the act itself that rep-
resents those consequences. Cf. (7) and (8): 
 
(7)   One should not confine one's actions merely to what is possible but 
should try, dare and risk doing as much good as possible. (Corpus: uk-
books/08. Text: B0000001257) - (A) 
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(8)   [A cricketer speaking:] When you have a finger injury you risk doing  
    something else because you take the ball differently. (Corpus: 
oznews/01. Text: N5000950419.) - (B) 
 
In (7) the possible unpleasant consequences of doing good are not 
spelled out, but in (8) the possible unpleasant consequences are precisely 
“doing something else” (than you should have done).  
 
 
Formal characteristics. 
 
Certain characteristics of the A and B categories are striking. It was sug-
gested above that nominal objects of risk with the A sense are typically 
preceded by a possessive adjective. This is overwhelmingly the case: out 
of 95 nominal objects with a possessive in the material, 90 have the A 
sense and 5 the B one. Another a little less pronounced tendency is that if 
the object of risk is a gerund, risk will be B in more than three cases out 
of four (168 out of 220). Although there are no very obvious formal or 
syntactic dividing lines between the two types of risk, it is not unlikely 
that they will be more clearly differentiated in the future. As Carey Be-
nom says5: 
 
Semantic differentiation occurs, diachronically, prior to syntactic differentiation, as 
well as motivating it. Initially the semantics begin to diverge, and only later are the 
conceptual differences reflected structurally. However, when there are syntactic dif-
ferences, there is stronger evidence for distinct senses, as we are not dependent on 
the linguist’s intuition. 
 
 
Ambiguity and context analysis. 
 
With two related but different meanings in the same word there are inter-
pretational dangers arising out of ambiguity, “multiple meanings at the 
                                                      
 
 
 
5 http://cerebro.psych.cornell.edu/emcl/longabs/cb.pdf  
(date of access, April 2006) 
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level of more complex syntactic structures”.6 Let us follow the road into 
increasing ambiguity. As often happens, what is ambiguous in isolation 
can be quickly resolved by the textual or situational context. For instan-
ce, in (9): 
 
(9)   Blinder, of course, is an inflation dove, a Clinton-appointed Fed board 
member who would risk a bit of inflation to stimulate growth. (Corpus: 
times/10. Text: N2000951104.) 
 
“A bit of inflation” would normally suggest an undesirable phenomenon 
that may occur if certain measures are taken or neglected, thus a B inter-
pretation, but as a Fed board member Blinder is obviously in a position 
to bring on inflation, in order to achieve the higher targets expressed in 
“to stimulate growth”. “Risk a bit of inflation” thus means ‘decide on 
creating a bit of inflation, risky as it may be’, an A interpretation. 
In other cases, it is less evident whether the object refers to what is 
being put at risk or to the unwished-for consequences, and the context 
will have to be analysed fairly closely for the ambiguity to disappear: 
 
(10)  I thought I was going nowhere then but before the start of last season 
Huddersfield came in and I was totally sold on the place. It took courage 
for them to risk a transfer tribunal, which eventually put me around 
<KPD> 60,000, and I'll always be grateful to them. Corpus: sunnow/17. 
Text: N9119980403.  
 
The speaker, presumably a footballer, could mean either that the club 
were courageous in deciding to appear before a transfer tribunal despite 
the unspecified uncertain outcome, which would be an A case, or that 
they were courageous in taking certain unspecified steps that might result 
in a tribunal; the danger that might materialise would thus be the tribunal 
itself, a B case. Given the seemingly bad repute of transfer tribunals,7 a 
B interpretation may seem marginally more likely. 
                                                      
 
 
 
6 Ravin and Leacock (2000: v). 
7Cf. “fearful of what might happen at a transfer tribunal”, “a bitter wrangle at a 
transfer tribunal” (Cobuild Corpus). 
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The difference between the two types of interpretation can thus be 
slight or elusive, but it is important enough in the context of power poli-
tics: 
 
 (11)   Although the Hungarians immediately appealed to the United Nations 
for support, the Soviets moved in quickly with troops and tanks. For 
once, John Foster Dulles was not willing to risk a confrontation, and the 
non-Communist world stood by as the Hungarians were brutally forced 
back into the Soviet camp. (Corpus: usbooks/09. Text: B9000001429.) 
 
(A): ‘The American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was not will-
ing to stage a confrontation, which might have disastrous consequences.’ 
(B): ‘Dulles was not willing to take steps that might result in a disastrous 
confrontation.’ 
 
(12)   But it is clear that Mr Assad is unwilling to risk meeting Shimon Peres, 
the Israeli Prime Minister, before a deal on ending the state of war be-
tween Israel and Syria. (Corpus: times/10. Text: N2000960312.) 
 
(A): ‘Assad is afraid his meeting Peres before the deal would have harm-
ful consequences.’ 
(B): ‘Assad is afraid he might happen to meet Peres before the deal.’ 
 
(13)   Lloyd George, unwilling to risk another fight with the military, reluc-
tantly relented. (Corpus: ukbooks/08. Text: B0000000551.) 
 
(A): ‘LG, unwilling to provoke another fight with possibly dangerous 
consequences..’ 
(B): ‘LG, who would not accept the unwished-for possibility of a fight 
...’ 
 
As we move into more and more palpable ambiguity we have to depend 
more and more on context for our interpretation. “Context” here means 
more than the immediate linguistic environment; it also comprises “gen-
eral knowledge of the world, more specific knowledge that is shared 
between participants in a conversation, information that was introduced 
earlier in the discourse, and the specific circumstances in which a dis-
course or conversation takes place” (Tanenhaus 1992: 288-289). In the 
great majority of cases, what is ambiguous in a narrow perspective 
ceases to cause any problems when more contextual elements are taken 
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into account. The general reader would presumably hesitate between an 
A and a B reading of (11) - (13), and it is easy to think of situations 
where an unintended reading could cause confusion or harm. However, 
an observer with a more intimate knowledge of the characters and indi-
vidual histories of the protagonists of (11) - (13) might not therefore find 
the sentences ambiguous at all. 
 
 
Distinguished and undistinguished senses. 
 
As we have seen, there is a clear distinction between senses A and B of 
risk, and most of the time there can be no discussion as to which sense is 
being meant. We have also seen that there are ambiguous cases where 
the speaker/writer intends either A or B but where the hearer/reader’s 
choice between them is not obvious and where the outcome of the 
choice, which will significantly affect the final interpretation, is ulti-
mately dependent on sometimes peripheral contextual information. But 
there is also a third case. The polysemy of risk can be awkward, simply 
because the perspective of the speaker/writer is not always obvious even 
to himself/herself. If what you risk is something valuable on the A read-
ing (“risk life”) but something undesirable on the B reading (“risk 
death”), neutral phrases like “risk a lot”, “risk more”, “risk a situation”, 
“risk a very great deal”, “risk anything”, “much to risk” tend to blur the 
line between an A and a B interpretation. Consider sentence (14): 
 
(14)   Prayers are sometimes answered by the experience of more struggle, by 
our being plunged into situations where we must risk more than we ever 
dared before. (Corpus: usbooks/09. Text: B9000001453.)  
 
(A): ‘We have to hazard more, put more at risk’ (more suggests some-
thing valuable) 
(B): ‘We have to expose ourselves to the possibility of more harm (dam-
age, dangers, losses, etc.)’ (more suggests something unpleasant) 
 
In such cases readers or listeners can follow one of several interpreta-
tional avenues. The first is that of resorting to a default reading. One of 
the two possible readings will seem to be a generally more likely one, 
which in case of doubt readers will automatically prefer to the alternative 
reading. The default will in that case probably be the more frequent of 
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the two. To find out which of them, if so, is the default reading, all the 
cases of the verb form risk in the Cobuild Corpus were analysed and 
classified as A or B occurrences. In the cases where an A classification 
seemed just as likely as a B one, the examples were classified as AB, and 
in the cases where either an A or a B classification seemed likely but less 
than certain a ? was added. The result of the analysis is this: 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the verb risk over semantic classes 
 
  A A? B B? AB ? Total 
 Raw fig.s 254 2 360 33 14 2 665 
 Per cent 38.2 0.3 54.1 5.0 2.1 0.3 100.0 
 
It seems, then, that if either of the two interpretations is to function as 
default, it is the B one, with 59.1% as against 38.5% for A. Intuitively it 
may also seem more natural that you should risk something unpleasant or 
dangerous than something valuable. 
Another avenue of interpretation becomes relevant when again either 
A or B can apply and it is likely that neither speaker/writer nor hearer/ 
reader bothers to make a distinction between them. Consider (15): 
 
(15)   But when a person's drug has potentially negative consequences and he 
continues using it anyway, we must conclude that he is deriving deeper, 
unacknowledged payoffs from it - secondary gains for which he is will-
ing to risk a lot. Corpus: usbooks/09. Text: B9000000440. 
 
(A): gains for which he is willing to hazard many things he values 
(B): gains for which he is prepared to endure many hardships 
 
The sentence is unproblematic as it stands because we don’t feel called 
upon to distinguish between the two senses of risk. Both may apply at the 
same time. This is a case of vagueness or indeterminacy, discussed for 
instance by Geeraerts (1993). What happens here, I would suggest, is that 
hearers/readers, and probably also speakers/writers, desist from making 
the usual distinctions relevant to the word in question and rely on a more 
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general or abstract meaning common to the two alternatives.8 As Ravin 
and Leacock put it in a different context (2000:22), the two meanings 
“are not disjoint but rather components of a single word sense”. In this 
case that meaning might be ‘accept the possibility of negative conse-
quences in order to gain something valuable’. This raises what seems at 
first to be an awkward question about the status of our verb. According 
to a common definitional test of polysemy, “[a] word is polysemous if 
more than a single definition is needed to account for its meaning. In 
classical terms, a word is polysemous if a single set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions cannot be defined to cover all the concepts ex-
pressed by the word” (Ravin and Leacock 2000:3). If, therefore, the defi-
nition of risk just given should be necessary and sufficient, the word 
would not be polysemous, according to the definitional test. However, 
precisely because the suggested definition is abstract and general, it is 
under-specified and therefore generally not sufficient. It will serve the 
hearer/reader who is only interested in a broad understanding of the sub-
ject-matter in question, and it will act as a kind of temporary measure to 
tide the hearer/reader who wants to understand the subject-matter in de-
tail over a potential quirk in the written or spoken communication, but 
more information will be needed for the different senses expressed by 
risk to become clear. This may be said to illustrate the point raised ear-
lier, viz. that the status of a word in a monosemous - polysemous dimen-
sion is not given once and for all. It will vary not only for theoretical 
reasons depending on which semantic theory is being applied, but also 
for practical reasons, because individual speakers will differ over seman-
tic nuances in a word. 
The different possible types of relationship between senses A and B 
could perhaps be as illustrated as in Figure 1, where A/B is intended to 
represent the default method with either A or B as the preferred option, 
and where A+B represents the more abstract amalgamation of the two 
senses. 
                                                      
 
 
 
8 Cf. Kjellmer (1993).  
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Figure 1. Relations between senses A and B 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
A conclusion that one may draw after considering a polysemous verb 
like risk is that polysemy is in fact quite likely to give rise to ambiguity. 
In most cases, however, the potential awkwardness of ambiguity can be 
handled satisfactorily by hearers and readers, thanks to contextual infor-
mation. If the context is not sufficiently informative and the ambiguity is 
therefore not resolved instantly, they will resort either to a default inter-
pretation or to a general, less specific interpretation. In the business 
world of today, particularly in financial institutions such as insurance 
companies, specialists in finance devote themselves to “risk analysis” 
and “risk management”, terms that are frequent and often well defined. It 
is now obvious that competent users of English, i.e. specialists in lan-
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guage use, will also have to engage in both “risk analysis” and “risk 
management” in a linguistic sense, an activity that will assume a differ-
ent kind of specialist knowledge, but one which is no less demanding and 
chiefly applied on the subconscious level. Language is a highly sophisti-
cated system. 
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